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Introduction
The largest expansion of entitlement programs in the United States in decades -Medicare Part D --is set to commence on January 1 st of 2006. On that day, retirees will be eligible for subsidized insurance covering outpatient drug prescriptions. No one has questioned the expected benefits of this program. Conscientious use of prescription drugs to treat chronic illnesses has been proven to be an effective deterrent to costly surgery and hospitalization. The questions about this new entitlement program has centered on estimated overall costs (an estimate of $450B rapidly escalating to $750B), member contribution (the so-called "donut hole"), and the decision to rely on private sector entities called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage these costs.
Health care covered by insurance has to be managed because of the separation of treatment and purchasing decisions from payment decisions. PBMs have emerged in the last 15 years as specialists in managing the outpatient drug benefit portion of insurance plans. While there is substantial evidence that PBMs are effective in controlling drug costs, there are persistent concerns about "conflict of interest" and ability of PBMs to match the Federal government in negotiating rebates from brand name drug manufacturers (hereafter "Big Pharma").
PBMs operate under a variety of corporate structures and scales. Today, the industry is dominated by three large independent PBMs {hereafter the "Big 3") -Caremark Rx, Medco
Health Solutions, and Express Scripts. Together they manage approximately 50% of all outpatient prescriptions covered by private or government health insurance plans. 1 The rest of the industry consists of independent PBMs that are captives of large drugstore chains such as Walgreen and CVS, captive PBMs of large insurance companies such as Aetna and CIGNA, and independents known as pharmacy benefit administrators (PBAs) that manage all aspects of
Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) plans except rebates.
PBMs use a variety of techniques to contain costs. These techniques are generally grouped into the following categories: (1) claims processing, (2) retail network management, (3) formulary and rebate management, (4) mail order pharmacy, and (5) drug utilization review. PBMs role in claims processing, mail order, and drug utilization review has be described correctly as one of an efficiency-minded, allocation agent. The analysis of these techniques has been within the framework of traditional price theory. However, we will make the case in this paper that price theory has been applied incorrectly to analyze formulary and rebate management.
PBMs play a dual role in formulary and rebate management. The overriding goal of PBMs is to contain the growth of drug spending, as measured by health care plan per member per month costs (PMPM). The PBM allocation agent seeks to contain PMPM by steering members toward generic drugs. The PBM bargaining agent seeks to contain PMPM by negotiating rebates with Big Pharma. Unfortunately, both pundits and analysts have failed to distinguish the two roles.
This leads to the misconception that rebates are a form of price discrimination with the largest rebates going to entities with the greatest price elasticity of demand. In the popular press, this misconception takes the form of statements that PBMs receive rebates in consideration for "moving markets". Price theory also fails to pinpoint where PBMs receive the bulk of their rebates. This leads to unfair comparisons of PBM performance and unconditional statements about the superiority of government vis-à-vis the private sector in negotiating drug rebates.
How PBMs See Themselves
There are several reasons why PBMs are so vague when describing their role in formulary and rebate management. PBMs feel a need to present themselves to investors as performers. But, admitting that they receive rebates for moving markets exposes them to anti-kickback laws that are prevalent in the health care field. If they said that they received rebates in exchange for passivity, they would scare off investors and expose themselves to antitrust laws. 
Secrecy of Rebate Data
Rebate formulas negotiated between Big Pharma and PBMs are closely guarded secrets protected by non-disclosure agreements. There is vague antidotal data on rebate rates and the distribution of the rates across drugs and therapeutic classes. But not even antidotal data can be found on the specific shape ("F-shaped" or "S-shaped") of market share rebate formulas. The "best price" Medicaid formula negotiated between Big Pharma and the Federal government is well known, and national averages are published ever year. But, even the government is prohibited from disclosing details such as the distribution of rebate rates by therapeutic class.
The fact that pharmaceutical rebate formulas and data are such closely guarded secrets is suggestive of a market where players have pricing power and where secrecy is important to negotiating the best deal with the other side. It is in competitive markets of price-takers that full public disclosure of transactional prices has no effect on a player's deal-making ability. But, the level of secrecy surrounding pharmaceutical rebates exceeds that typically found in markets characterized by bilateral oligopoly. For these are transactions between health care providers and health care payers subject to explicit anti-kickback, antitrust, and fiduciary laws.
Furthermore, data on the quantity side -e.g., discretionary switching of patient prescriptionsare closely guarded secrets that are protected by strict patient privacy laws.
Recent Medco Disclosures
Medco Health Solutions, the second largest independent PBM, has made some recent disclosures that provide unprecedented evidence of the importance of rebates to the gross profits 
The Formulary as a Set of Markets
PBMs began as insurance claims processing specialists. Their core competency in the 1980s was transactions cost economizing. Their expertise in computer networking enabled PBMs to port claims processing to the retail pharmacy point of sale. Until PBMs came along, insurance companies were reluctant to cover outpatient prescriptions because claims processing costs were such a disproportionate share of the claim itself. In addition, insurance companies knew that they could avoid reimbursing a significant portion of claims if members had to "shoe-box" receipts and file claims manually.
As managed care ascended in the 1990s, PBMs realized that a key technique for managing prescriptions in hospitals could be ported to the pharmacy point of sale. That technique is known as a formulary. Typically, the national formularies of large PBMs have 60 to 80 different therapeutic classes. A committee of experts group brand and generic drugs into sets that they deem therapeutically equivalent, hence substitutable. PBMs and clients further order therapeutic classes by cost, including estimated rebates, and effectiveness. In order to provide comprehensive care, PBMs have to make sure that all non-formulary drugs have at least one formulary drug that is therapeutically equivalent.
A therapeutic class can be viewed as a market -a place where choices are made from a set of substitutable goods. A formulary is a group of separate markets. On the buy side are the Big 3
PBMs controlling around 50% of all outpatient prescriptions. Big Pharma is on the sell side facing three possible competitive environments: (1) 
Formulary Compliance as a Bargaining Chip
When a prescription is ordered, a formulary embedded in point of sale software matches the prescription against the list of all drugs deemed therapeutically equivalent. PBMs subdivide each therapeutic class by preference based on the overall objective of containing a client's drug spending. Today, most formularies have three levels of preference, or tiers. The "tier 1" is reserved for low cost generic drugs. The "tier 2" is reserved for preferred, or formulary, brand drugs. The "tier 3" is reserved for non-preferred, or non-formulary drugs. Cost more than effectiveness distinguish the difference between generics in "tier 1" and brands in "tier 2". The difference between brands in" tier 2" and brands in "tier 3" tends to be effectiveness more than costs. Often member co-payments are correlated with tier preference. Co-payments have a significant effect on purchasing decisions, but because co-payments are a discretionary choice of the plan sponsors, and not PBMs, they are not relevant to rebate bargaining.
PBMs can exercise discretion in both formulary design and compliance. PBMs do not begin the formulary design process by presenting clients with a blank look-up table. They begin the process with their "owned" national formulary and assist clients in customizing the national formulary based on proprietary financial modeling software. A test of the hypothesis that the design of the national formulary is consistent with a bargaining agent is presented in a later section.
We consider now discretion in formulary compliance and its dual use as an allocation and bargaining tool. Today's three tiered formularies are so "open" that PBMs have considerable discretion in initiating switches in prescriptions. There are three types of switches possible (1) a generic for its off-patent brand which is know as generic substitution (2) a generic for a brand which is know as generic-brand therapeutic interchange; and (3) a brand for another brand which is know as brand-brand therapeutic interchange. The need to deliver a competitive PMPM limits the scope of discretionary formulary compliance to switches that either reduce costs or clearly improve effectiveness, preferably both. State laws also place limits on switching. Usually, state laws permit pharmacists to switch a generic for its higher cost off-patent brand because they are near perfect substitutes. Switching between therapeutic equivalents --generic for a brand or brand for brand usually requires prior approval of the prescribing physician.
The average nominal price of ingredients in a brand prescription is approximately $65 while the average nominal price of ingredients in a generic prescription is $16. This is a 4:1 ratio that cannot be overcome by rebates. PBMs know that giving up the right to generic-brand therapeutic interchange jeopardizes their ability to deliver a competitive PMPM to clients. On the other hand, brand-brand therapeutic interchange is essentially a substitution between two drugs that are close enough in nominal prices -within 20% --that switches, or lack thereof, can be offered in consideration for receiving rebates without jeopardizing PMPM objectives. Brand-brand therapeutic interchange is the only bargaining chip given up in exchange for rebates.
PBMs have been subject to numerous lawsuits essentially claiming the last statement is false.
There are two types of "sins" that PBMs could commit in the area of discretionary formulary compliance: a "sin of commission" and a "sin of omission". PBMs have been accused of actively switching high cost brands for lower cost generics. This is a "sin of commission" that dozens of state attorney generals and Federal prosecutors are investigating. If PBMs are guilty of anything, it is a "sin of omission" because this indiscretion is so hard to detect, but potentially just as lucrative as a "sin of commission". It is possible that PBMs are accepting rebates for passively allowing on-patent brand prescriptions to be filled when there are lower cost generics that could be substituted. In sports terminology, PBMs are "playing not to lose, rather than playing to win."
The only deterrent to this passivity is competitive pressure from other PBMs touting their superior performance. Since the "conflict of interest" issue has come into prominence in 2003, we believe that "playing not to lose" is not an option for the Big 3.
Captive Mail Order Pharmacy As a Source of Bargaining Power
Both independent PBMs and captive PBMs within insurance companies find it economic to own their own mail order pharmacy operations. It is rare in the health care industry for payers to own providers. Mail order pharmacies facilitate discretionary therapeutic interchange more than retail pharmacies because of the time delay permissible between order placement and order delivery.
The economic benefit of captive mail order operations transcends corporate structure. Because mail order facilitates discretionary formulary compliance, it enhances PBMs dual roles as an allocation agent and a bargaining agent. Mail order is prized for facilitating generic substitution and generic-brand therapeutic interchange. But, in the case of potential brand-brand switches, mail order also enhances PBMs ability to negotiate rebates in exchange for abstaining from brand-brand switches.
Pharmacy benefit administrators (PBAs) do not own their own mail operations. This fact supports the view of PBMs as bargaining agents. As we will explain in detail later, the government gave up considerable rights in the area of discretionary formulary compliance when they negotiated the Medicaid formula with Big Pharma in 1990. Because PBAs are not involved in Medicaid rebate negotiations and because the Medicaid deal with Big Pharma bans generic-brand therapeutic interchange, PBAs place no special value on owning their own mail order operation either as a boost to bargaining or cost-containment.
Ownership of the Pharmacy Transaction as a Source of Bargaining Power
Another point that we wish to make is that PBMs success as both an allocation agent and a bargaining agent is enhanced immeasurably by the fact that it has to power to coerce, not just the power to suggest. PBMs are not typical purchasing agents whose preferences become suggestions to clients. PBMs legally own the pharmacy transaction and resell drugs to consumers whose payment is covered by insurance. Recently, several large human resources consulting companies have proposed to Fortune 500 clients the possibility of "carving out" rebate management from PBMs and forming a separate group. The group would feature 100% passthrough of rebates and only charge members administrative fees. Bargaining theory suggests that "carve out" groups like this are not likely to match PBMs performance because of the inability to carry out threats of brand-brand discretionary therapeutic interchange. 
Rebates as the Fixed Component of a Two-Part Tariff
Bargaining theory and price theory differ as to the expected functionality of rebate formulas.
Basically, bargaining theory predicts that rebates would tend to be non-linear because they represent a lump-sum transfer of economic surplus. Furthermore, Big Pharma wishes to avoid a price war and lump sum payments signal that intention. Price theory would predict that rebates are linear functions of quantities demanded. Linear rebates serve as a signal that a seller is trying to increase demand at the expense of competitors. A test of these different expectations would be simple to conduct if rebate contracts were accessible. However, both the rebate contracts and those that negotiate them are locked up in a slew of non-disclosure clauses and agreements.
The language used to describe the two types of rebates is ambiguous about functionality.
Formulary rebates are often described in terms of "access" or "cover charge" or "pay to play".
These metaphors alone are very suggestive of a two part tariff used in rent extraction, or in this case, rent-sharing. PBMs would never admit publicly that access rebates are a function of a firm's size because this would trigger anti-kickback and antitrust inquiries. The language use to describe market share rebates clearly supports price theory's expectations. But, we would argue that intent depends on the specific shape of the formula. If the function were more "F-shaped" than "S-shaped", then market share rebates would function more as a "stop" and a barrier to entry than an incentive to prefer one drug at the expense of another.
Are Rebates Designed to Move Markets?
The following statement was the source of our first effort at formalizing PBM behavior: 8 The market-share rebate (MSR) is typically based on a sliding scale system according to the number of units of a particular medication that are dispensed, sold, or processed through the PBM as compared with its competitors in a class of medication.
Drugs that compete in a crowded marketplace typically choose the MSR when negotiating with PBMs. The goal is to provide incentives for the PBMs to place its drug in a favorable position on the formulary and to move as much of its drug as possible.
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A number of legal questions turn on whether PBMs behave as "service-providers" or "fiduciaries". 9 10 Fiduciaries exercise discretion in plan design with material consequences. Service providers merely assist plan sponsors with their decision-making. We conceptualized PBMs and market share rebates as Big Pharma's solution to an uncoordinated "formulary game". 11 PBMs brought discipline to the buy-side by starting the design process with a single preferred brand drug in each therapeutic class. Plan sponsors could customize what PBMs offered, but would be penalized for the "marginal consequences" of deviations from the national formulary. We summed up PBMs role in formulary design as follows: "Closed formularies do not move markets, closely aligned one do."
We have used the fact that national formularies are a discretionary act of PBMs to test the hypothesis that PBMs have a conflicted business model that affects their performance. 12 The formulary data gathered in that study is also applicable to the hypothesis that PBMs design their national formularies to move markets. If this were the case, PBMs would be expected that place only a single brand drug in the "tier2" of a therapeutic class. The rest of the brands would be relegated to "tier 3". To enforce this preference, PBMs might design rebate redistribution formulas that would penalize clients severely if they failed to mirror PBMs "owned" national formulary.
. concern that PBMs are a poor alternative to the Federal government when it comes to negotiating with Big Pharma.
The purpose of this section is go beyond simple comparisons of rebate averages as measures of performance. We will argue that there are two problems with weighted averages. First, the distribution of rebates is bi-model as predicted by bargaining theory. This means that both the Medicaid and the Medco statistic is a poor reflector of negotiating power in oligopolistic classes.
What is needed is a disaggregation of rebate rates by broad classes. Second, bargaining theory emphasizes that there are two sides to rebate deals. While the Federal government gets more from Big Pharma, it also gives up more. Comparisons of the relative performance of the Federal government and PBMs should not be based on rebate rates alone, but the overall performance as measured by PMPM.
A recent letter from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides an unprecedented breakdown of the familiar 19% average rebate that the Medicaid program receives from Big Pharma. 13 The Medicaid formula is as follows: in return for being eligible for reimbursement by
Medicaid, a drug's manufacturer must rebate the government the greater of 15.1% of its average price (AMP) or the difference between the "best price" given to a private sector reseller and the 15.1% minimum. The CBO letter revealed that 36% of Medicaid drug spend received a "best price" rebate. A full 64% of Medicaid brand drug spend received the minimum. In addition, the CBO letter provided shocking evidence of the value of a little known clause in the Medicaid deal that gave the government inflation protection. The value of that clause amounted to an additional 11.7% across all drug spend in 2003. Table 1 presents a full disaggregation of the Medicaid average rebate rate of 19.6% (31.4% including the 11.7% inflation protection add-on). The key derivation is a 27.6% average rebate rate for "best price" drugs. Services suggests a good deal of confusion over whether PBM rebates qualify as "best price" . 14 Rebates are only one side of the bargain. The other side of the bargain must also be examined.
We have presented the case earlier that PBMs give up discretionary brand-brand therapeutic interchange in exchange for rebates. Close examination of the law specifying what the government gave up in exchange for Medicaid rebates indicates that they gave up considerable rights to discretionary therapeutic interchange. 15 When the Medicaid deal was struck in 1990, generic drugs were not the factor that they are today. In 1990, insulating one brand from being switched had little cost implications because the "other" was another brand of similar costs.
Today, insulating one brand from being switched has potentially large cost implications because that "other" can be a low cost generic. Quite simply, the government did not have the foresight to consider the implications of what it was giving up when it signed the Medicaid drug deal with Big Pharma in 1990.
As generic drugs have risen to prominence in the marketplace, the government has forced Big Pharma to modify the deal. In 1993, generic substitution -a generic for its off-patent brand -was allowed. The original law gave states the right to impose "prior authorization" restrictions on formulary drugs. This has become a controversial, but highly lucrative, bargaining chip that states have give up in exchange for additional rebates. 16 . In sum, the Federal government gets more from Big Pharma that PBMs, but it has also given up more.
A recent study conducted by the Lewin Group correctly evaluates the performance of benefit managers on the basis of overall drug spend delivered, as measured by PMPM, and not narrowly on such statistics as rebate rates or utilization rates. 17 The study compared overall PMPM of a two sets of Medicaid plans. One set of plans-known as Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) -are run by government agencies who adhere to Medicaid formulary guidelines limiting discretionary therapeutic interchange. The other set of plans -known as Medicaid MCO -are privately managed and not eligible for Medicaid "best price" rebates. The managers of the drug portion of these plans-PBMs -negotiate rebates with Big Pharma in exchange for giving up some discretion, but fully retain the right to make generic-brand switches. PBMs get less from Big Pharma than government, but they have given up less.
The study found that Medicaid FFS plans received rebates averaging 15 percentage points higher than Medicaid MCO plans. However, the discretion allowed by PBMs who managed
Medicaid MCO plans enabled them to deliver a 59% generic utilization rate --number of generic prescriptions divided by the sum of all prescriptions --compared to a 50% rate of found in Medicaid FFS plans. Even more dramatic was difference in usage rates --number of prescriptions per member per month. PBMs were able to deliver a usage rate that was 15 to 20
percentage points lower than Medicaid FFS plans. Overall, the PMPM of privately managed plans was 10 to 15 percentage points lower than government run plans despite lagging in rebates. The results of this study clearly demonstrate the weakness of concluding that government is the superior bargaining agent solely on the basis of rebates.
